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Abstract—Voice input has been tremendously improving the
user experience of mobile devices by freeing our hands from
typing on the small screen. Speech recognition is the key
technology that powers voice input, and it is usually outsourced
to the cloud for the best performance. However, the cloud might
compromise users’ privacy by identifying their identities by voice,
learning their sensitive input content via speech recognition, and
then profiling the mobile users based on the content. In this paper,
we design an intermediate between users and the cloud, named
VoiceMask, to sanitize users’ voice data before sending it to the
cloud for speech recognition. We analyze the potential privacy
risks and aim to protect users’ identities and sensitive input
content from being disclosed to the cloud. VoiceMask adopts a
carefully designed voice conversion mechanism that is resistant to
several attacks. Meanwhile, it utilizes an evolution-based keyword
substitution technique to sanitize the voice input content. The
two sanitization phases are all performed in the resource-limited
mobile device while still maintaining the usability and accuracy
of the cloud-supported speech recognition service. We implement
the voice sanitizer on Android systems and present extensive
experimental results that validate the effectiveness and efficiency
of our app. It is demonstrated that we are able to reduce the
chance of a user’s voice being identified from 50 people by 84%
while keeping the drop of speech recognition accuracy within
14.2%.
Index Terms—Privacy protection, voice input, voice privacy,
voice sanitizing, speech processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Featuring hand-free communication, voice input has been
widely applied in keyboard apps (e.g. Google, Microsoft,
Sougou, and iFlytek keyboards), voice search (e.g. Microsoft
Bing, Google Search) and artificial intelligence personal as-
sistants (e.g. Apple’s Siri, and Amazon Echo) on a range
of mobile devices. Voice input can greatly ease our lives by
freeing our hands and attention from the time-consuming work
of typing on the small screen of mobile devices. It is also
one of the major means of human-computer communication
for people who are visually impaired. The key technology
that powers voice input is speech recognition, also known as
speech-to-text conversion, where the vocal input of spoken
language is recognized and translated into texts. Due to the
resource limitation on mobile devices, the speech recognition
is usually outsourced to the cloud server for higher accuracy
and efficiency [10], [18], which are two key elements leading
to a good user experience for voice input systems.
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Fig. 1: Our system architecture. The cloud is a specialized speech recognition
service provider. We design a secure voice input app on mobile devices that sanitizes
the recorded voice input before sending it to the cloud.
However, most of the existing voice input service providers
collect their users’ speech records1. Because the voice datasets,
once correlated with the identities of the speakers, will reveal
various private information describing the individuals, we
argue that the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) should
not be disclosed to the cloud (e.g., MAC addresses/Device
IDs/User IDs associated with the datasets). This can be
achieved by leveraging existing anonymous networks such as
Tor [7], [8]. However, with such a naı¨ve sanitization voice
records can still be de-anonymized by linkage attacks with the
speaker recognition technology. Linkage attacks are possible
because different individuals have different voice character-
istics (i.e., voice biometrics), and such voice biometrics can
serve as fingerprints of the speech datasets.
In this paper, our goal is to protect the speech data privacy
for voice input users while maintaining the user experience.
Our strategy, in general, is to perturb the speech data in order
to remove the personally identifiable voice fingerprints for
the sake of complete anonymity for individual users. Our
research also benefits existing voice input service providers
by providing them with better data security. Because users’
privacy is preserved at the data level and no individuals will
be identified from the datasets the companies possess, they are
less likely to be held responsible for the privacy leak caused
by data breach once it occurs.
We are facing two privacy risks in the cloud-based voice
input services. On one hand, the cloud (or third parties who
1This was validated through recent news [1], [4] and private communication
with several researchers working in the voice input industry.
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obtained the voice data from the cloud) may link the speech
records to individuals in real life by harnessing the speaker
recognition technology. If the cloud is able to collect some
speech samples of the target person from other sources like
YouTube and train a voice model of this person, then it
can identify the records belonging to this person from the
speech database, which leads to the user’s identity privacy
breach. On the other hand, the cloud can also analyze the
content of users’ speeches and learn more detailed private
information. The cloud may use natural language processing
techniques to extract information from a user’s voice search
history, voice command history, and even SMS messages and
emails if they were typed via voice input, which leads to the
user’s content privacy breach. Then the cloud can paint a very
accurate picture of the user’s demographic categories, personal
preferences, interpersonal communications, habits, schedules,
and travels. Therefore, the risk of privacy disclosure from
speech data is real, and we believe it is very necessary to
come up with countermeasures and stop the leak of privacy
from its source, that is, our smart mobile devices.
There are also serious security risks of existing voice input
service architecture, such as spoofing attack to speaker au-
thentication systems. Voice as a type of biometric information
has been widely used in emerging authentication systems to
unlock smart devices, gain access to some apps like WeChat,
and activate services like Apple’s “Hey Siri” and Google’s
“OK Google”. Once the cloud collects enough voice samples
from a user, it can create an accurate voice print and use it
to synthesize other speeches that sound like this user [13],
[34], which may be exploited to spoof the voice authentication
systems and gain access to the user’s private resources. Worse
still, the leaked voice can be used for fraud or to produce
illegal recordings to frame and blackmail the person [3], [6].
In order to mitigate the aforementioned two privacy risks
and avoid the security risk, we have two corresponding sub-
goals in privacy preservation: 1) preserving the users’ identity
privacy and 2) preserving their speech content privacy. The
challenges are fourfold. Firstly, we have to sanitize users’
speech data without degrading the accuracy of speech-to-text
conversion to an unacceptable extent. In other words, the
users can still use the voice input app to transform their
voice into text with high accuracy as before. We should
ensure the accuracy of speaker recognition on the sanitized
data by the cloud is greatly decreased while the accuracy
of speech recognition on them is well preserved. Secondly,
it is challenging to protect speech content privacy because
it requires us to solve three sub-questions: what information
is considered sensitive/private? how to locate the sensitive
content within the speech? how to hide the sensitive content
without influencing the user experience? Thirdly, speech as a
type of unstructured data is hard to be processed in a privacy-
preserving manner. Traditional secure multi-party computation
methods cannot be employed directly. Cryptographic tools like
searchable encryption for information retrieval do not apply
to speech recognition either. Lastly, it is hard to perform
speech sanitization in real-time efficiently with the restricted
resources on the mobile device. The computation overhead
should be small enough to induce acceptable latency for the
voice input apps. The power consumption by the sanitization
process should also be limited.
The naı¨ve method is to simply perform speech recognition
locally without the help from the cloud. No privacy is leaked
in this way, but the performance of offline speech recognition
is inferior due to the limited computing resources on mobile
devices [20]. The local speech models cannot be updated
timely as well. On the other hand, the cloud already provides
free services so they tend to collect data as much as possible.
Most of these companies are unwilling to release offline
speech recognition products. Google Nexus allows us to use
offline voice typing but only when we are disconnected from
the Internet. As a result, we cannot expect the cloud to provide
unconditional offline speech recognition service for users and
we still have to rely on the powerful cloud to support more
accurate speech recognition. To protect privacy, we need to
sanitize the speech data on the mobile device before sending
it to the cloud for speech recognition.
Our solution: To ensure the cloud has access to only the
sanitized speech data, our basic solution is to introduce an
intermediary app (referred to as “VoiceMask” hereafter) to
perturb the speeches. It acts as a third-party voice input app
that connects users’ mobile devices to the speech recognition
cloud. The voice sanitizer processes the audio signal received
from the microphone and then sends the sanitized speech
audio to the cloud. The sanitization is conducted from two
aspects: (1) It disguises the speaker’s identity by randomly
modifying the speaker’s voice using the voice conversion
technology, and (2) it perturbs the contents of voice input
via keyword substitution to hide the sensitive information
from being disclosed to the cloud. The two complementary
perturbations performed locally in real time on the speech data
ensure that the cloud (and the voice input app) learns neither
users’ identity nor their private input contents.
Contributions: To the best of our knowledge, VoiceMask
is the first privacy-preserving architecture for the voice input
function on mobile devices. We decouple the voice input app
and the cloud to prevent the cloud from learning users’ private
information through the app (Section III). We then propose
two light-weighted techniques for mobile devices to protect
user identity and voice input content from being leaked to
cloud servers. The user identity privacy is preserved by a voice
conversion technique that is resistant to the reversing attack or
the reducing attack (Section IV-A). The input content privacy
is preserved by a randomized keyword substitution heuristic,
consisting of an evolution-based keyword spotting method for
sensitive word detection and a differentially private algorithm
for safeword set construction (Section IV-B). We implement
VoiceMask on Android systems and conduct extensive evalu-
ation (Section V).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. System and Adversary Models
The voice input service provider usually consists of an app
on the user end and the cloud that performs speech recognition.
We assume it is honest but curious. It honestly executes the
pre-designed protocol and provides a good user experience
of voice input, but it might exploit the data it can access
to learn the user’s sensitive information. We also assume
the data collected by the cloud is anonymous. For example,
Apple has applied privacy-enhancing techniques to prevent
their data analysts from seeing the user accounts associated
with the data2. Meanwhile, users who wish to achieve full
anonymity can employ the anonymous network to stop the
cloud from obtaining their PII. Please note this paper aims to
defend against only voice input apps (and their cloud). There
are certainly many other apps undermining our privacy, like
browsers and emails, but how to defend against them is not
our focus.
B. Privacy Risks
Most voice input service providers collect their users’
speech data. For instance, Apple stores our Siri voice com-
mands for 24 months [1] and Google stores everything we
say to Google Now by default [4]. Thought they claim they
will not sell our data in the privacy policy, they do analyze our
data, which may compromise our privacy. There are two types
of privacy in this paper’s scope: identity privacy and content
privacy.
To attack the identity privacy of a target person, the service
provider may gather the person’s speech audios from another
source, for example from her YouTube channel or her posts on
online social media. Then, a voice model that represents the
person’s voice biometrics can be trained in order to identify her
utterances in the stored speech database. In 2014, GoVivace
Inc. started to provide speaker identification SDK for telecom
companies to infer the caller’s identity by matching her voice
with a database containing thousands of voice recordings. In
our experiment, we can identify one person out of 250 candi-
dates with a 100% success rate given that we have collected
several speeches of this person (as short as 30 seconds). The
detailed settings of this experiment will be presented in Section
V-A. Once a person’s utterances is identified, the service
provider will be able to mine more private information from
the speech content.
Furthermore, the voice service provider may also invade
users’ content privacy. After executing speech recognition, the
service provider can extract personal information from user’s
utterances using natural language processing techniques. Some
of the information within the utterances could be sensitive,
e.g. demographic attributes, personal preferences, schedules,
and interpersonal relations. Thus, the content privacy of users’
speech data could be disclosed. Such privacy issue is always
2Apple’s privacy policy on data analytics,
https://www.apple.com/privacy/approach-to-privacy/
a serious concern when we use any cloud-based speech
recognition service.
Although these two types of privacy concerns are quite
different, they may lead to a worse privacy breach if com-
bined together. For example, with detected sensitive contents
(such as phone number or home address) from the speech
recognition, the speaker can be easily identified. even from a
huge candidate pool. Therefore, we have to address these two
types of privacy risks simultaneously.
III. SOLUTION OVERVIEW
A. System Architecture
A sketch of the privacy-preserving voice input system is
depicted in Fig. 1. The cloud is a server dedicated to providing
speech-to-text service. It does not install apps on the mobile
end. Instead, the voice sanitizer (like a keyboard app) bridges
the communication between the user, the cloud, and third party
apps. It is trusted, e.g. it can release the source code to the
public. The voice sanitizer accesses the raw audio, perturbs it,
and produces sanitized audio which contains much less private
information about the user. After the sanitized speech is sent
to the cloud and the corresponding transcript is sent back, the
voice sanitizer revokes some of previous perturbations on it
and restores it to the desired transcript. Finally, the transcript
is copied to the input box of any other app on the device that
has requested user input before. Notice that the voice sanitizer
is locally deployed in mobile devices, and it is independent of
the cloud service provider. Such separation prevents the cloud
from collecting private information from the user device.
The internal system architecture of the voice sanitizer is
illustrated in Fig. 2. Given a stream of raw audio signals, the
sanitization process can be divided into two modules: keyword
substitution and voice conversion. The whole process can be
explained with a simple example. Suppose a user is writing
a text message to a friend. She reads a sentence to the mic,
“I’d love to, but I have to attend a group therapy tomorrow”.
Suppose she has set “group therapy” as a sensitive keyword
previously, the voice sanitizer detects its occurrence within
the speech and then substitutes it with a selected safeword
“meeting”. Then, the voice sanitizer converts the speech to
another voice and sends the sanitized speech to the cloud.
The cloud performs speech recognition and sends back the
perturbed transcript “I’d love to, but I have to attend a meeting
tomorrow”. Finally, the voice sanitizer reverses the substitution
and copies the desired text to the input box of the SMS app. In
this process, the sensitive information contained in the original
speech is not disclosed to the cloud. Nor is the user’s voice
characteristics, which otherwise might be utilized for linkage
attacks or spoofing attacks. This is only an illustrative instance.
More issues and detailed solutions will be introduced later.
B. Adaptive Keyword Substitution
Protecting content privacy is very challenging as content pri-
vacy is hard to define, let alone protecting it on unrecognized
speeches. To achieve this goal, we focus on a simplified case:
sensitive keyword substitution on the speeches. As shown in
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Fig. 2: The internal architecture of VoiceMask.
Fig 2, the process of keyword substitution contains two steps –
keyword spotting and safeword substitution. Our approach first
detects the specified sensitive keywords and then replaces them
with carefully selected safewords. Here, the sensitive key-
words are predefined by the users. They could be nouns like
“hospital” and “addiction”, verbs like “smoke” and “bribe”,
adjectives like “alt-left” and “alt-right”. The user needs to
read each keyword for at least one time to train the voice
sanitizer, and the STFT features of these utterances (referred
to as keyword samples) will be kept for keyword spotting. The
set of safewords is predefined by our system and identical to all
users. The keyword spotting and safeword substitution must be
done in real-time with light computation cost. We achieve such
goals by limiting the number of keywords defined by users and
a simple DTW (dynamic time warping) based method.
Keyword spotting identifies keywords directly from the
utterances. It is usually used for keyword monitoring, speech
document indexing, and automated dialogue systems [11],
[37]. We design an adaptive keyword spotting mechanism
based on DTW, which is well suited for real-time scenarios.
The general idea is straightforward. The voice sanitizer scans
the input audio stream and computes the distance between
the audio signal within a sliding window and the sensitive
keyword samples recorded by the user previously. A DTW
algorithm is applied here to calculate the distance of two
signals, which can address the issue of dynamic speak rate
and various audio lengths. STFT features are computed and
cosine distance is used as the metric. If the distance between
the signal of the speech segment being scanned and the signal
of the keyword sample is below a certain threshold θ, the
corresponding segment is considered as a sensitive keyword.
However, to realize this idea, there is one more obstacle:
liaison, a very common phenomenon in English pronuncia-
tion. The existence of liaison enlarges the distance between
two identical words if they occur in different contexts. For
example, the word “apple” can be pronounced as “napple”
in the context of “an apple”. Thus, directly comparing the
extracted voice signals without considering liaison would lead
to a high false negative rate. To handle this issue, we introduce
an evolutionary model for representing the keywords. For a
given keyword, the stored keyword sample evolves over time.
When the user speaks a sentence containing this keyword and
it is correctly detected by our app (a hit), the stored keyword
sample will update itself with this new audio sample. (The
voice sanitizer would know a detected keyword is indeed a
hit if the user does not revise the text recognized by it.) Let
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Fig. 3: Bilinear functions: A bilinear function is monotone increasing in the domain
[0, pi] and the range [0, pi]. When α < 0, the low frequency part of the frequency axis
is compressed and the high frequency part is stretched. When α > 0, the low frequency
part is stretched while the high frequency part is compressed. Fig. (b) gives an example
of the spectrogram of a speech before and after its frequencies are warped.
x be the feature vector of a stored keyword sample, y be the
feature vector of the i-th correctly detected keyword, and φ(y)
represents the warped feature vector after DTW processing.
To update the existing keyword sample, each element of x is
updated by the following equation.
x′(k) =
i
i+ 1
· x(k) + 1
i+ 1
· φy(k). (1)
This updating process mitigates the impact of liaison by laying
more emphasis on the middle part. We also allow users to
point out the missed keyword and improve the corresponding
recorded keyword in the same way.
Safeword substitution: After spotting the keyword, we
replace it with a word chosen at random from the safeword
set. Voice sanitizer will keep the log of such replacement,
which enables re-substituting the safeword back after receiving
the perturbed transcript from the cloud. This randomized
substitution also avoids the privacy leakage from choosing
safeword. We will present more details in Section IV-B.
C. VTLN-Based Voice Conversion
To protect identity privacy for users of voice input service,
we design a mechanism on top of the voice conversion technol-
ogy. Voice conversion algorithm modifies a source speaker’s
voice so that it sounds like another target speaker without
changing the language contents. One of the most popular
voice conversion paradigms is frequency warping [29], which
is based on the well-studied technique of vocal tract length
normalization (VTLN) [12], [15]. Given a source utterance,
VTLN-based voice conversion processes it in 6 steps (Fig.
2). Pitch marking and frame segmentation aim to split the
speech signal into frames that match the pseudo-periodicity
of voiced sounds as determined by the fundamental frequency
of the voice, so as to make the output synthetic voice have the
best audio quality. The key step of voice conversion is VTLN,
which modifies the spectrum of each frame using frequency
warping, that is, stretching or compressing the spectrum with
respect to the frequency axis according to a warping function.
One of the most commonly used warping function is the
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bilinear function [9], [29]. The formula of this function is:
f(ω, α) = | − i ln z − α
1− αz |, (2)
where ω ∈ [0, pi] is the normalized frequency, α ∈ (−1, 1) is a
warping factor used to tune the strength of voice conversion,
i is the imaginary unit and z = eiω . Several examples of
the bilinear function are plotted in Fig. 3. Given a frequency-
domain data frame, every frequency ω is changed to a new
frequency f(ω, α) by this formula. Then all the frequency-
warped frames are reverted to the time domain by IFFT.
Finally, all the frames are concatenated to generate the output
speech, and a technique PSOLA is utilized to improve the
speech quality [31]. Therefore, an utterance is produced with
the same language content but a different voice. This is the
basic idea of protecting the identity privacy, yet it is not that
easy. There are several issues to consider, including how to
minimize the influence on the audio quality of the output
speech and how to select α to achieve a strong privacy
guarantee. We will discuss the details in Section IV-A.
IV. IDENTITY & CONTENT PRIVACY
A. Protecting User Identity Privacy
When we disguise the speaker’s identity by randomly
modifying her/his voice to another voice, it is required that
the speech content can still be accurately recognized when
it is uploaded to the cloud so that user experience is not
degraded unacceptably. As aforementioned, the parameter α in
the bilinear function tunes the extent of distortion of the output
voice. Setting α < 0 would produce a deeper (more like low-
pitched) output voice; setting α > 0 would produce a sharper
(more like high-pitched) output voice. The greater |α| is, to a
higher extent the output voice is distorted. The output voice is
not distorted at all when α is 0. (See Fig. 3 for the reason.) We
want to select the best α that can bring a considerable drop in
the speaker recognition accuracy whereas the decrease of the
speech recognition accuracy is minimized. However, finding
the best value of α is not enough, because if we always use
the same α to transform a user’s voice to the same fake voice,
the cloud may build a model on this fake voice and use it to
recognize this user afterward. In addition, the cloud may find
the value of α by decompiling the apk of the voice sanitizer,
and then reverse the voice conversion to recover the original
voice. Reversing voice conversion attack is possible because
the warping functions are invertible. Take bilinear functions
as an example, f(w,−α) is the inverse function of f(w,α).
Therefore, we need to find a proper range of α and randomly
choose α from this range every time. Now the question is,
what is the proper range and how randomly should we choose
α from it to ensure reversing voice conversion is impossible?
Randomized warping factor selection: Suppose the proper
range of the warping factor α is A. In fact, we found
A = [−0.10,−0.08] ∪ [0, 08, 0.10] experimentally (we will
present details in Section V-B1). Every time the user speaks
a sentence, the voice sanitizer randomly selects α ∈ A, uses
Eq. (2) to warp the frequency of the speech and then sends it to
the cloud. The cloud receives speeches in different voices even
when they are from the same user, so it is almost impossible to
directly use the previously trained voice models to recognize
the user’s identity.
However, there is still a possibility that the cloud can reduce
(“partially reverse”) the voice conversion to a weaker level so
that it can achieve a higher speaker recognition accuracy. The
bilinear function f(ω, α) we adopt has a property:
f(f(ω, α1), α2) = f(ω, α1 + α2). (3)
That said, applying voice conversion twice to a speech with
α1 and α2 successively yields exactly the same output as
applying the voice conversion once with α = α1+α2. Suppose
the cloud has received many sanitized speeches from users
whose voices have been converted with α ∈ [0.10, 0.12]. It
can apply a second voice conversion to these speeches with
α2 = −0.11. Now the produced speeches are actually the
output speeches of voice conversion with α ∈ [−0.01, 0.01],
which has much weaker distortion strength than the originally
sanitized speeches. Consequently, the cloud can achieve better
accuracy than we originally expected when performing speaker
recognition on these speeches. We refer to this process as
reducing voice conversion attack, and we say a function is
reducible if it has the property in Eq. (3). To our knowledge,
this issue has not been studied in previous research papers.
Besides the bilinear function, other common warping functions
like the symmetric function [30], the power function [15] and
the quadratic function [25] are also reducible. Therefore, a
more complex mechanism must be designed.
Secure compound warping functions: To design a warping
function that is resistant to the reducing voice conversion
attack, our technique is to compound two different warping
functions. Here we introduce another commonly used warping
function that is easy to tune, the quadratic function [25]:
g(ω, β) = ω+β(
ω
pi
−(ω
pi
)2), where ω ∈ [0, pi] is the normalized
frequency and β > 0 is a warping factor. Similar to α in
the bilinear function, β determines the distortion strength of
this function. The output voice turns deeper when β < 0
and sharper when β > 0. Luckily, the compound function
of f and g (denoted as h) is not reducible. The formula of
h is: h(ω, α, β) = g(f(ω, α), β). Since the two independent
parameters α, β are used in combination, they have a much
bigger proper range (will be studied in Section V-B3). Now if
every time the voice sanitizer perturbs a speech from the user,
it randomly picks a pair of values for α, β from this range
as the warping factors. This mechanism ensures the cloud is
unable to reverse or reduce the voice conversion.
However, it is challenging to learn the combined impact of
α, β on the distortion level of the output voice. To estimate it,
we need to first quantify the distortion strength of the warping
function h. An intuition is that the closer h is to the identity
function, the less distortion h brings to the output voice. Take
Fig. 3(a) as an example, the closer the bilinear function is to
the identity function, the closer α is to 0, and the less distortion
it produces on the output voice. This way, we can measure the
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distortion strength of h by the area between the curves of itself
and the identity function.
Definition 1 (Distortion strength): The distortion strength
(denoted as dist) of a warping function f(ω,a) is defined as
the area between the curves of itself and the identity function,
i.e. distf (a) =
∫ pi
0
| f(ω,a) − ω |, where a represents the
warping factors.
We will discuss how to find the proper range using this
definition in Section V-B3.
B. Protecting Speech Content Privacy
Content privacy is achieved by substituting sensitive key-
words with safewords, so the first task is to construct a
safeword set.
Differentially private safeword set construction: We
don’t want to replace a keyword in a user’s speech with a
more sensitive word because this would harm her personal
reputation, for instance, when the keyword “doctor” in “I need
to see my doctor” is changed to “probation officer”. Thus, we
need to avoid putting common sensitive words in the safeword
set. But how does the voice sanitizer know which words
are usually sensitive? We introduce a new central server that
connects all the voice sanitizer apps and collects the keywords
defined by users for statistics. The server ranks these keywords
by frequency and then knows which words are commonly
viewed as sensitive. Nevertheless, we cannot fully trust the
server. Directly sending each user’s sensitive keywords to
the server would break their privacy. Inspired by [16], we
design a privacy-preserving randomized keyword aggregation
algorithm (PRAKA) that achieves differential privacy based on
the randomized response mechanism [14]. Given a vocabulary
V that contains all the possible keywords and a parameter p
set by the user to tune the privacy level, the voice sanitizer
executes the algorithm in the following steps. For each word
w ∈ V: (1) Create a 2-bit array B = [b1, b2] and initialize it
to ‘00’. (2) If the user sets w as sensitive, then set b1 to 1;
otherwise set b2 to 1. (3) For each bit i of B, set it to 1 with
probability p2 , set it to 0 with probability
p
2 , or do not modify
it with probability 1− p. Let the new array we get be B′. (4)
Report 〈w,B′〉 to the central server. We have the following
theorem (see proof in Appendix A).
Theorem 1: PRAKA achieves 2 ln 2−pp -differential privacy.
Since the user reports to the server only once for each w, the
privacy level would not degrade over time. When the server
collects enough reports from users, it estimates the frequency
of each word set as sensitive by users. For each w, let N be
the total number of reports, let n be the number of reports
where bit 1 was set, the estimated number of users who really
set b1 = 1 is calculated by nˆ = (n− p2N)/(1− p). The error
bound is given in Appendix B.
Randomized safeword selection: Given a safeword set,
we split it into several subsets such that words within a subset
are more similar to each other than words in another subset.
For instance, a simple categorization is singular nouns, plural
nouns, transitive verbs, intransitive verbs, adjectives, and ad-
verbs. Each subset is a bucket of safewords. The categorization
TABLE I: Statistics of the datasets in our evaluation.
Dataset #Speakers #Speeches Hours English accents
PDA 16 836 1.8h Mostly native
LibriSpeech 251 27.7k 100h All native
Volunteers 14 240 0.7h Various accents
is pre-defined in the app. When the voice sanitizer spots an
occurrence of a keyword, it randomly picks a safeword from
the corresponding bucket to perform safeword substitution.
V. EVALUATION
A. Emulation Setup
We run the emulation on three datasets. PDA: PDA is
a speech database from CMU Sphinx Group [2], which
contains 16 speakers each speaking over 50 short sentences.
The number of female and male speakers are well balanced.
They are all native English speakers, and 12 of them speak
American English. LibriSpeech: LibriSpeech corpus is from
OpenSLR [21], containing 100 hours speech, clearly read by
251 native speakers of American English without background
noise. Volunteers: This dataset was collected by ourselves from
14 college students (11 males and 3 females). Thirteen of them
are not native speakers and they have various accents from 9
countries. Their statistics are shown in Tab. I.
We utilize the Speaker Recognition API and the Bing
Speech API from Microsoft Cognitive Services, which pro-
vides the state-of-the-art algorithms for spoken language pro-
cessing [5], [35]. The steps of evaluation go as follows. First,
we create a speaker recognition system and use the training set
to train a voice model for every speaker in the three datasets.
Second, we process the utterances in the test set using our
voice sanitizer. We perform voice conversion differently for
male and female speakers. Specifically, we deepen female
voices (by setting α < 0) and sharpen male voices (by setting
α > 0) to make their voices closer in pitch so as to increase the
difficulty for the adversary in distinguishing different speakers
(validated by experiment). Third, we use the trained voice
models to identify the speakers of the sanitized utterances
and evaluate the accuracy of speaker identification. Finally,
we perform speech recognition on the sanitized utterances and
evaluate the accuracy.
Metrics: We measure the performance of speech recogni-
tion using word accuracy, which is calculated by one minus
word error rate (WER). The accuracy of speaker recognition
is defined as the success rate, that is, the fraction of correctly
identified speakers. By default, we measure the accuracy of
identifying a speaker from a set of 50 candidates, but we also
study the cases where there are much more candidates (Fig.
5). We measure the performance of keyword spotting using
ROC curve, which illustrates the performance of a binary
classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied.
The computation overhead of the voice sanitizer is measured
by realtime coefficient, the ratio between the CPU time for
processing the audio and the duration of the audio.
B. Emulation of Voice Conversion
1) Effectiveness: Both speech recognition and speaker
recognition have accuracy degradation when the utterances are
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Fig. 4: The impact of voice conversion on the accuracy of speaker/speech
recognition. When |α| ∈ [0.02, 0.10], the accuracy of speaker recognition goes down
significantly.
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Fig. 5: Speaker recognition accuracy vs |α| and the number of candidates (on
LibriSpeech). The accuracy of speaker recognition decreases when |α| increases or
when there are more candidates.
processes by our voice sanitizer, but the extent of degradation
with respect to a specific |α| is different for them. We can
observe that in Fig. 4. Speakers can be correctly identified
with a 100% chance when α = 0, i.e. on original utterances.
Speech recognition on the original utterances achieves an
accuracy > 80%. When voice conversion is applied with |α| ∈
[0.02, 0.10], the accuracy of speaker recognition degrades
sharply with growing |α| while that of speech recognition is
barely influenced. The huge gap provides us an opportunity
to find a value range of |α| to overcome our key challenge,
that is, to suppress the speaker recognition possibility while
preserving the speech recognition utility. According to this
figure, the proper range of |α| can be set to [0.08, 0.10].
That said, if we use only the bilinear function in the voice
conversion for LibriSpeech and choose |α| from [0.08, 0.10],
the accuracy of speaker recognition on the output speeches
would be restricted within 0.20 but the speech recognition
accuracy is still maintained at 0.72 ∼ 0.75. The results for
PDA are even better: the speaker recognition accuracy is
restricted to be smaller than 0.13 while the speech recognition
accuracy is in 0.77 ∼ 0.81.
The accuracy of speaker recognition is also partially up
to the number of candidates from which the cloud identifies
the target speaker, as shown in Fig. 5. However, if we do
not apply voice conversion, the accuracy decreases extremely
slow such that it is still 1 when we identify the speaker from
250 candidates. (We could not try more candidates because of
the limit of dataset we obtained.) This figure shows that our
method can reduce the speaker recognition accuracy by 90%.
2) Computational Cost: We record the CPU time of voice
conversion on every utterance. The time of pitch marking and
other 5 steps, and the total CPU time are all proportional to
the duration of the utterance. Pitch marking is the most time-
consuming step. The realtime coefficient of voice conversion
is 0.42 on average (Tab. II). We also find that the warping
parameter α has little influence on the computational cost.
3) Emulation of Robust Voice Conversion: We have pre-
sented the idea of adopting a compound function h(ω, α, β)
in Section IV-A, so now we try to find the proper range of
α, β for this function. By Definition 1, the distortion strength
of our compound function h(ω, α, β) can be estimated. Now
the question is, what is the boundary of a proper distortion
strength? As mentioned in Section V-B1, the proper range of
|α| in the bilinear function f is [0.08, 0.10]. The corresponding
distortions are distf (0.08) = 0.32, distf (0.10) = 0.40. So we
adopt these two values as the boundary of a proper distortion:
dist ∈ [0.32, 0.40]. Fig. 7(b) shows the proper range of α, β
for h such that 0.32 ≤ disth(α, β) ≤ 0.40. By randomly
selecting α, β from this range every time we convert the voice
of a speech, we can achieve our goal of impeding speaker
recognition while preserving speech recognition, plus the goal
of preventing the reducing voice conversion attack. An exper-
iment on PDA demonstrates the efficacy of this technique, as
presented in Fig. 6. The test on the unsanitized speech (dark
blue bars) and weakly sanitized speech (green bars, bilinear
function with α = 0.08) is also given as a contrast. After the
speeches are perturbed by voice conversion with the compound
warping function, the speech/speaker recognition accuracy
decreases to 0.68 and 0.16 respectively, as indicated by the
yellow bars. We can improve speech recognition accuracy by
lowering the privacy level.
C. Emulation of Keyword Substitution
We evaluate the performance of our keyword substitution
method on LibriSpeech. For every user, we constructed the
keyword set by randomly choosing words from the transcripts
and then manually labeled the occurrences of these words
among all the speeches of this user. We apply our evolution
based method to detect the keywords, and then compare the
results with the labels. If the difference between detected
start/end time and labeled time is smaller than 0.05s, this
detection would be considered as correct.
As illustrated in Fig 8, without updating the keyword sam-
ples, the detection accuracy approximates to random guess.
Our evolution based algorithm helps to improve such detecting
accuracy to 90%, as indicated by the red line. To measure
the computational cost, we assume there is one keyword per
utterance. The most common case is zero or one keyword
because most words in a sentence are insensitive at all. The
realtime coefficient of substituting one keyword is 0.60, as
shown in Tab. II. The overhead is proportional to the number
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Fig. 6: Comparison of different voice conversion techniques. We compound the
bilinear and quadratic functions to improve the robustness, though the performance is
not as good as using only bilinear function.
7
Voice conversion Keyword substitution TotalPitch marking Other steps Subtotal Keyword spotting Substitution Subtotal
Real time coefficient 0.35 0.07 0.42 0.56 0.04 0.60 1.02
Standard deviation 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.07
TABLE II: Real time coefficient of voice sanitization
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Fig. 7: The impact of α, β on voice distortion and their proper range.
of keywords. With the development of keyword spotting, we
can achieve better efficiency in the future.
Put it all together: We combine the two sanitization phases
(keyword substitution and voice conversion) altogether and run
the same experiment. The impact of speech sanitization on
the accuracy of speech recognition and speaker recognition
is presented in Fig. 9. Keyword substitution has a marginal
impact on the performance of speech/speaker recognition. It
is shown that we can reduce the risk of a speaker from being
identified (given 20 candidates) from 100% to 16% at the cost
of decreasing the speech recognition accuracy by 14.2%. The
computation overhead of speech sanitization is given in Tab.
II. The total real time coefficient is 1.02.
VI. DISCUSSION
Speech segmentation and randomization: There is an
alternative to prevent the adversary from performing voice
conversion on the speech reversely. The voice sanitizer ex-
ecutes speech segmentation and randomizes voice conversion
on each segment. We observe by experiment that if a word
or phrase is split into two halves and they are transformed
to two different voices, they can hardly be recognized by the
cloud. We can randomly partition the speech into segments
with random size (segments are separated by the gaps between
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Fig. 8: ROC curve of (evolution-based) keyword spotting.
Speech recog. Speaker recog.
A
cc
cu
ra
cy
0
0.5
1
Raw speech
After KS
After VC
After KS+VC
Fig. 9: The impact of keyword substitution (KS) and voice conversion (VC) on
the accuracy.
words) and then independently convert the voice of each
segment with randomly selected parameters.
Compatibility with voice assistants: We aimed to protect
the identity privacy of users of voice input and voice search.
For voice assistant, some services activated by voice com-
mands require authentication of the user (by other means,
e.g. password, two-factor), e.g. creating an event on the
calendar. The user’s PII is inevitably exposed to the voice
assistant, which appears to be against our goal. Today’s voice
assistants like Google Assistant usually works by three steps:
speech recognition (voice input), command understanding, and
command execution. The first step is not necessary for a voice
assistant. We suggest it be decoupled from the voice assistant
because users experience a higher privacy leak risk when all
their data are stored at one single party. Instead, the voice
input task can be taken on by a third-party dedicated to speech
recognition and users connect to it through the voice sanitizer.
Assumption about PIIs: This paper assumed the cloud
doesn’t have users’ PII, which can be achieved by existing
widely deployed anonymous networks such as Tor [7], [8].
Yet at present, most of the speech recognition service providers
have users’ PII. However, our voice sanitizer still helps alle-
viate the risk of privacy breach. For one thing, every user’s
voice is converted to many different voices, which can reduce
the chance that the user is recognized in real life. For another
thing, the voice sanitizer hides the sensitive phrases in the
speeches so it will be more difficult for the cloud to learn the
speech content of the user.
VII. RELATED WORK
Security and privacy on voice data have been concentrated
on in previous works from two main aspects. Spoofing at-
tack to speaker verification systems has received considerable
attention in the area of speaker recognition. The simplest
methods are replay and human impersonation. More powerful
techniques include speech synthesis [13] and voice conversion
[34]. Meanwhile, many robust speaker verification techniques
have been proposed to defend against those spoofing attacks
[32], [33]. Other researchers [23], [24] proposed to use secure
multi-party computation (SMC) to implement and achieve
speaker verification in a privacy-preserving fashion. Smaragdis
et al. [28] were the first to design an SMC-based secure speech
recognition, though it is said to be a rudimentary system and
the cryptographic protocols are computationally expensive. In
addition, privacy learning has also been a focus in spoken
language analysis. For example, Dan Gillick [17] showed that
word use preference can be utilized to infer the speaker’s
demographics including gender, age, ethnicity, birth places
and social-status. Mairesse et al. [19] designed classification,
regression and ranking models to learn the Big Five personality
traits of the speaker including “extraversion vs. introversion”.
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Other sensitive information contained in the utterance such as
emotions [22] and health state [27] could also be inferred by
speaker classification methods.
Another related work by us [26] studied and quantified the
privacy risks in speech data publishing and proposed privacy-
preserving countermeasures. By the way, there is a body of
work on distributed speech recognition e.g. [36] for mobile
devices. It enables the device itself to extract spectral features
from the speech and then send them to the cloud where the
features are converted to text. Distributed speech recognition is
not commonly used yet and the main purpose is to reduce the
communication cost. Though the user’s voice is not directly
exposed, still the features like MFCC can be used to extract
voice print and reconstruct the voice accurately.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Now we are speeding toward a not-too-distant future when
we can perform human-computer interaction using solely our
voice. In this work, we present a light-weight voice sanitization
app that achieves a good protection of both user identity and
private speech content, with minimal degradation in the quality
of speech recognition. Our system adopts a carefully designed
voice conversion mechanism that is robust to several attacks.
Meanwhile, it utilizes an evolution-based keyword substitution
technique to sanitize the voice input content. Possible future
work includes explicitly defining identity privacy for voice
input users and achieving adaptive speech recognition while
preserving identity privacy.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: This proof is inspired by [16]. Let B′ = [b′1, b
′
2]
be the new Bloom filter we get after Step 3 of PRAKA. For
any i = 1, 2, we have
P (b′i = bi | bi) = 1− p+
p
2
= 1− p
2
,
P (b′i 6= bi | bi) =
p
2
.
For any two distinct values of B, say B1 = [0, 1] and B2 =
[1, 0] without loss of generality,
P (B′ ∈ R | B = B1)
P (B′ ∈ R | B = B2)
=
∑
B′∈R P (B
′ | B = B1)∑
Bk∈R P (B
′ | B = B2)
≤ max
B′∈R
P (B′ | B = B1)
P (B′ | B = B2)
=max
b′1,b
′
2
(p
2
)b′1 (
1− p
2
)1−b′1 · (1− p
2
)b′2 (p
2
)1−b′2
(
1− p
2
)b′1 (p
2
)1−b′1 · (p
2
)b′2 (
1− p
2
)1−b′2
=max
b′1,b
′
2
(p
2
)2(b′1−b′2) (
1− p
2
)2(b′2−b′1)
=max
b′1,b
′
2
(
2− p
p
)2(b′2−b′1)
≤
(
2− p
p
)2
(since0 ≤ p ≤ 1).
Hence, PRAKA satisfies -DP where  = 2 ln 2−pp .
APPENDIX B
ERROR BOUND OF nˆ
Let n0 be the true number of users who set b1 = 1, then
n = X + Y where X ∼ B(N − n0, p2 ), Y ∼ B(n0, 1 − p2 ).
The probability mass function of n is
Pr(n = k)
=
k∑
i=0
(
N − n0
i
)(
n0
k − i
)(p
2
)n0−k+2i (
1− p
2
)N−n0+k−2i
.
(4)
Since nˆ = (n− p2N)/(1− p), we have the error bound
Pr(|nˆ− n0| ≤ )
= Pr(− ≤ nˆ− n0 ≤ )
= Pr((1− p)(n0 − ) + p
2
N ≤ n ≤ (1− p)(n0 + ) + p
2
N)
=
b(1−p)(n0+)+ p2Nc∑
k=d(1−p)(n0−)+ p2Ne
Pr(n = k).
(5)
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